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NIGHT THOUGHTS: REFLECTIONS ON
THE DEBATE CONCERNING
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE*
John V. Ortht
A few years ago, there was a brief vogue in legal scholarship for what was
called story-telling. I am not sure I ever understood the method, but story-
telling (at least as I understand it) came to mind as I followed the debate con-
cerning the legal treatment of same-sex marriage. I would like to begin my
reflections by telling a personal story. (Those uncomfortable with this
approach may treat it simply as a hypothetical case.) Afterwards, I want to
review some of the legal consequences of marriage, with particular reference to
the property consequences. Same-sex couples, denied the legal status of mar-
riage,1 are obviously excluded from these consequences, and that forms a prin-
cipal, but not the sole, ground on which their exclusion is criticized. Next, I
will consider to what extent same-sex couples can approximate these conse-
quences by the use of other legal arrangements. Finally, I want to ask not
whether we should exclude same-sex couples from the legal consequences of
marriage, but how we should decide which couples to include. First, the story.
THE STORY OF MAUD AND MARY
Maud and Mary were sisters and my aunts. They and my father were the only chil-
dren of my grandparents to survive to adulthood. Maud was born in 1900 and Mary
in 1905. They never married but lived with their parents, then together for their
entire life. Mary worked outside the home as a laboratory technician; Maud carried
on a modest business as a hairdresser out of their home, but mainly she ran the
household, doing the cleaning and cooking. Despite Mary's employment, it was
* An earlier version of this article was presented as a lecture at the William S. Boyd School
of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas, March 2002. The author is grateful to the School
of Law and particularly to Professor Carl Tobias for the invitation.
t William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
Marriage has many aspects other than the legal one. In its religious aspect, marriage may
be regarded as a sacrament and regulated by canon law. See, e.g., CODEX IURIS CANONICI,
cann. 1055-1165 (1983). Throughout this article, marriage is considered solely in its aspect
as an institution of civil law. As Blackstone, speaking of English common law, said over
two hundred years ago, "Our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract.
The holiness of the matrimonial state is left entirely to ecclesiastical law .... I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 421 (1765). The use of the same
word "marriage" to describe both the sacramental and the legal relationship and the fact that
state law generally authorizes religious functionaries to solemnize legal marriages, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2000), risks the confusion of the two aspects, particularly in the public
mind.
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Maud who managed their finances. Economically they functioned much as a typical
married couple with one wage-earner, although they filed separate income tax
returns. When they died intestate in 1998, Mary in January and Maud in December,
I was appointed administrator of their modest estates.
Maud and Mary functioned as a couple; but, of course, in contemplation of law, they
were not a couple. Their only recognized legal relationship was as siblings. Their
real property, when they had any, was held as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship. Otherwise, they maintained separate property: they had separate bank
accounts and held their investments in separate names. Settling their estates was
settling the estates of two unmarried individuals. Because the value of their estates
was below the threshold for federal estate taxation, the unavailability of the federal
marital deduction was irrelevant. For purposes of state inheritance tax, however, the
fact that they were not spouses exposed the property passing to the survivor (in this
case from Mary to Maud) to taxation; in addition, because the survivor was not one
of the state's "class A" beneficiaries, defined as "children, grandchildren, stepchil-
dren, and parents," the tax rate was higher. Mary's pension, which had formed a
major source of their combined income during retirement, ended with her death, as
did, of course, her Social Security benefits, which were far larger than those of the
self-employed Maud; Maud was not entitled to survivor's benefits in either. The law
simply ignored the fact that they had lived together as a couple for nearly a century.
In its legal aspect, marriage is not about love; it is not even particularly
about sex; it is mainly about property. With the possible exception of the aban-
donment of one by the other, the actual affective relationship of a legally mar-
ried couple, whether they are living together or apart, is irrelevant in
considering the property consequences of marriage.2 Given the declining legal
significance of illegitimate birth,3 the nearly complete decriminalization of
extra-marital sex,4 and the end of immunity for spousal rape,5 marriage law is
2 In a few states, statutes disqualify a surviving spouse from dower, inheritance, or an elec-
tive share if the spouse abandoned the decedent and committed adultery; sometimes, aban-
donment alone is sufficient. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 392.090 (1984); N.Y. EST., TRUSTS
& POWERS LAW § 5-1.2 (1981 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-1 (1999); VA. CODE
§ 64.1-23 (1987). With respect to other marital incidents, it has been argued that "[e]ven in
the absence of statute, the better view would seem to be to deny homestead and family
allowances to the deserting spouse upon the ground that these provisions for the preservation
of the family unit should not be allowed where the family relationship has been discontinued
through the fault of the claimant spouse." THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF WILLS § 37, at 152 (2d ed. 1953).
3 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding unconstitutional, as a denial of
equal protection, an Illinois intestacy act denying an illegitimate child inheritance rights
from the child's father); In re Estate of Dulles, 431 A.2d 208, 212-14 (Pa. 1981) (holding
unconstitutional, as a denial of equal protection, a statutory presumption that the word "chil-
dren" in a will did not include the father's illegitimate children); In re Hoffman, 53 A.D. 2d
55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (construing the word "issue" in a will to refer to illegitimate as
well as legitimate children, in the absence of an express statement to the contrary).
4 It seemingly remains permissible under the United States Constitution for a state to
criminalize homosexual sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986).
During its current term, the United States Supreme Court will be invited to reconsider Bow-
ers. See Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 661
(2002).
1 See, e.g., Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 226 (Ga. App. 1985) (finding no implicit
marital exemption in rape and aggravated sodomy statutes). But see, e.g., State v. Dominy, 6
S.W.3d 472 (Tenn. 1999) (finding spousal rape not a lesser included offense in aggravated
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decreasingly relevant to the legalities of sex. Everywhere, however, the legal
status of marriage is of great significance with respect to property. In about
half the states, legally married persons can hold real property as tenants by the
entirety; 6 in some states personal property can be held by the same title.7 Prop-
erty held as tenants by the entirety cannot be partitioned or transferred by one
of the owners acting alone.8 On the death of one, the survivor automatically
becomes the sole owner; the decedent's interest simply disappears; it cannot be
passed by devise or inheritance.9 In many states, creditors of one tenant by the
entirety cannot levy on the entirety property. 10 Some states not recognizing
tenancy by the entirety apply community property rules to married couples by
which all income earned by either spouse during the marriage is attributed one-
half to one and one-half to the other.'' All states give preference in case of
intestacy to a surviving spouse.' 2 Most states not applying community prop-
erty rules protect a surviving spouse from total disinheritance by providing an
elective share, a minimum percentage of the estate of the predeceasing spouse
regardless of the terms of the decedent's will.' 3 Some states provide a more
generous share to spouses inadvertently omitted (pretermitted) from a premari-
tal will. 4
rape). See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital
Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1375 (2000).
6 See John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety, in THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 33.06(e)
n.81 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (listing states).
7 See Don W. Llewellyn et al., Disclaimers by a Surviving Spouse: The Trend of Increased
Opportunities for Post Mortem Tax Planning Continues, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J.
1, 55 (2000) (listing twenty-eight states that do not recognize tenancy by the entirety in
personalty).
8 The theory of tenancy by the entirety is that the property is owned not by two persons but
by one entity, the marital unit. See Orth, supra note 6, at § 33.08(b). Tenancy by the
entirety is sometimes described as a specialized form of joint tenancy. Morris v. McCarty,
32 N.E. 938, 939 (Mass. 1893); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(26) (defining "joint
tenants with the right of survivorship" to include "co-owners of property held under circum-
stances that entitle one or more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or
others," that is, to include tenants by the entirety). This is to misconceive the history of the
estate, if not its present reality. See infra note 48.
9 See Orth, supra note 6, at § 33.02, at 95-97.
10 See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (Haw. 1977) (listing states). The federal
tax collector has rights ordinary creditors do not possess. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.
274 (2002). For conflicting views of the implications of this fact for the future of tenancy by
the entirety, see Steve R. Johnson, Why Craft Isn't Scary, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 440
(2002), and Albert F. Rush, United States v. Craft: Saying Goodbye to Tenancy by the
Entirety?, 17 PROB. & PROP. 59 (Jan./Feb. 2003).
" See generally WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1982).
12 See ATKINSON, supra note 2, at § 15, p. 62 (describing "one point of agreement" among
all states concerning the intestate share of the surviving spouse: "the spouse's case is so
strong that all blood relatives take subject to the spouse's share - whatever that may be in
the particular jurisdiction").
13 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 to 30-3.6 (2000). See also UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 2-202 to 2-207 (1993).
14 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.301 (1993); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (West 1998). See also
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-301 (1993). Cf CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-257(a) (voiding pre-
marital will unless it provides for contingency of marriage).
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None of these rules applies to the property of couples not legally married
to one another, but mechanisms are available to approximate their conse-
quences. Couples not legally married may take title to property, real and per-
sonal, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.' 5 To reduce the risk that one
joint tenant may sever the joint estate, either openly or without the knowledge
of the other, the parties may execute an agreement against sale or partition. 6 If
limited to a reasonable time, agreements against partition are presumptively
valid, 7 although courts are often reluctant to enforce them against an unwilling
party, particularly if circumstances have changed since the inception of the
agreement. 18 Agreements against sale, on the contrary, are generally regarded
as restraints on alienation and are therefore invalid, unless construed merely as
agreements not to demand partition by sale.' 9 Given the greater weight
accorded intention in modem law, agreements against sale of an undivided
interest may pass muster today, at least if limited to a reasonable time and so
long as circumstances have not changed. Unless recorded, of course, such
agreements would not prevent the actual sale of an undivided interest to a good
faith purchaser but would form the basis for an action for breach of contract in
case of such a sale. To lessen the risk of loss of the interest, or of other prop-
erty, at the death of one party, the unmarried couple may also execute mutual
wills leaving all or most of each testator's property to the other, and then may
enter into an express contract not to revoke or alter the will. Contracts concern-
ing wills certainly create legal obligations, but they are notorious producers of
litigation and their actual enforceability in specific cases is uncertain."0
Couples unmarried, in the legal sense of the word, may then, by adroit use of
joint tenancies, anti-partition agreements, mutual wills, and contracts not to
revoke the wills, gain some of the property consequences of legal marriage; but
protection of the property from creditors, at least as to the debtor's one-half,
seems to be beyond their reach.
Putting the couple's property together legally without marriage is, how-
ever, to address only the first part of the legal consequences of marriage. Legal
marriage can, of course, be legally ended by divorce at the demand of either
party, and with a final divorce decree many of the property consequences of
marriage are automatically terminated. Property held in tenancy by the
entirety, and perhaps also property held in joint tenancy by a married couple,2 '
'5 For a brief synopsis of the law of joint tenancy, see Orth, supra note 6, at § 31.02. For a
reappraisal of the law joint tenancy, see John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law: Plus Ca Change
... " 5 GREEN BAG 173 (2002).
16 A somewhat more exotic possibility is the creation of estates for joint lives with alterna-
tive contingent remainders in the survivor. For an analysis of this estate, see Orth, supra
note 6, at § 31.02. Although the life estate of each tenant (and, presumably, each tenant's
contingent remainder) is alienable, alienation would not terminate the contingent remainder
of the other.
17 See LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 117, at 249 (2d
ed. 1966).
18 See, e.g., Michalski v. Michalski, 142 A.2d 645 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1958).
19 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.76, p. 522 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
20 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 322
(6th ed. 2000).
21 For the effect of divorce on tenancies by the entirety, see Orth, supra note 6, at
§ 33.08(d). In a few states, statutes provide for the automatic termination of joint tenancies
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automatically converts on divorce into property held in tenancy in common, in
which each party has a severable interest, one that is partitionable, alienable,
devisable, and inheritable. 2 The inheritance rights of a surviving spouse, as
well as the right to an elective or pretermitted share in the testamentary estate
of the deceased spouse, end with the marriage, as do any provisions in favor of
the ex-spouse in the decedent's will. 23 To attempt to incorporate the functional
equivalent of divorce on demand into the anti-partition agreement and the con-
tract concerning the wills is to risk the almost certain nullity of the entire under-
taking. It is certainly beyond my drafting skills.24
The conclusion is inescapable that the law attaches valuable property con-
sequences to the legal status of marriage that cannot be duplicated, although
they can be approached, by private arrangements. This is to leave to one side
the consequences, wholly unalterable by private agreement, of public laws con-
cerning the rights of surviving spouses. Nearly all the states have homestead
laws that secure the family home to the surviving spouse and minor children,
free of the claims of creditors. 25 Related to homestead is the right of the sur-
viving spouse and sometimes of minor children to have set aside from the pro-
bate estate certain tangible personal property of the deceased spouse up to a
certain value. 26 Every state has a statute authorizing the probate court to award
a family allowance during the administration of the estate for the support of the
surviving spouse and often of dependent children. 27 The Federal Family and
Medical Leave Act provides employees, in certain circumstances, with the legal
right to unpaid leave to care for a seriously ill spouse.28 Federal law protects
(or creates) rights of surviving spouses in private pension plans, 29 individual
retirement accounts, and in the social security system. The tax laws, both state
and federal, afford significant opportunities for tax savings to married couples.
"Married filing jointly" is often advantageous for purposes of income taxation,
though as the recent debate concerning the so-called "marriage penalty"
held by married couples on divorce. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 9-12-317; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 552.102; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.20(C)(5).
22 See Orth, supra note 6, at § 32.02.
23 E.g., MASS. G.L. c. 191, § 9; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (2000). It is uncertain whether
divorce automatically terminates provisions in favor of an ex-spouse in will substitutes, such
as trusts. See Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985) (terminating trust provision
in favor of ex-spouse where trust was funded by pour-over will and was, therefore, part of an
integrated testamentary disposition).
24 Many of the same problems arise if a trust is created, despite the well-known flexibility of
trusts and their greater responsiveness to intention. An irrevocable trust might defeat credi-
tors and could tie-up property in favor of the survivor, but would, by definition, be immune
from revocation in case of irreconcilable differences between the settlors. A revocable trust
generally leaves each settlor's share exposed to creditors, and the very fact of revocability,
necessary to permit the exit of either settlor, means the device is ineffective to guarantee the
rights of the other settlor.
25 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 20, at 476.
26 Id. at 477.
27 Id.
28 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
29 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994 & Supp. 1998).
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reminds us, it is not so in every case.3° In addition, there is the unlimited
marital deduction from estate and inheritance taxes 3' and the possibility for
split-gifts by married persons to double the exemptions in federal gift and gen-
eration-skipping transfer taxes.
Beyond the pecuniary benefits of legally recognized marriage lies the
unquantifiable benefit of social recognition, as expressed by the law; couples
who cannot be legally married may feel that their relationship is devalued by
society. Religious groups, of course, are free to accept and solemnize same-sex
marriages; the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion certainly
extends to a sect's definition of matrimony. In addition, certain communities
and businesses may choose to accord a degree of recognition to couples not
legally married. 33 But some, at least, of the demand by same-sex couples for
legal marriage is a demand that the larger community represented by the state
formally accept the validity of their relationship by adding legal recognition.
From this perspective, the property consequences of marriage are actually sec-
ondary, important only as they reflect public acceptance of the marriage. To
the extent that the demand for legal same-sex marriage is a demand for broad
social acceptance, it will obviously not be satisfied by legal recognition of
euphemistic substitutes - such as "domestic partnerships," "civil unions," or
"reciprocal beneficiary relationships" - even if the legal consequences of these
relationships are identical in all respects to the legal consequences attached to
marriage.
Given the fact that the law accords special benefits, both tangible and
intangible, to legally married persons, the demands of couples who are denied
legal marriage deserve an answer. Fundamental fairness requires that like cases
be treated alike, and the constitutions, both state and federal, specifically guar-
antee "equal protection of the laws." 34 Yet courts have often ruled against the
claims of same-sex couples.35 The most common rationale is simply defini-
tional, that marriage is the "union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children"36 and that, therefore, same-sex couples are
not the same as opposite-sex couples and may constitutionally be treated differ-
30 See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETrER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997); Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: Criti-
cal Tax Studies and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1772-79 (1998).
31 26 U.S.C. § 2056.
32 26 U.S.C. § 2513 (gift tax); 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (generation-skipping transfer tax).
3' These provisions have not gone unchallenged. See Heidi Eischen, Survey, For Better or
Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation, 31 U.
TOL. L. REV. 527 (2000).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
35 E.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 197 1) (holding same-sex couple ineligible
for marriage license); Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, appeal dis-
missed, 624 N.E.2d 696, 604 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1993) (denying survivor of homosexual rela-
tionship rights of surviving spouse); but see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(holding that same-sex couples denied marriage licenses had stated a cause of action for sex
discrimination prohibited by state constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)
(holding denial of marriage license to same-sex couple a violation of state constitution). See
also Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons From Ver-
mont's State Constitutional Case on Same-Sex Marriage, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2001).
36 E.g., Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186; Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797(quoting Baker).
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ently. Statutes, both state and federal, have been adopted to enact this defini-
tion into law,3 7 and the Alliance for Marriage has proposed a federal
constitutional amendment, limiting "marriage in the United States" to "the
union of a man and a woman." 38
Perhaps because the latest challenge to legal marriage has been advanced
by same-sex couples, the defense of the status quo has centered on the sexual
relationship of such couples. 39 A different sex life, one with no reproductive
potential, it is argued, justifies a different legal treatment. In addition, the
claims of same-sex couples are also sometimes portrayed as a threat to conven-
tional morality. Turning the criticism of the status quo on its head, defenders
have argued that granting legal recognition to same-sex marriage would dimin-
ish respect for marriage in general, "by equating it with behavior that has been
condemned by Western society for thousands of years."4 This, in turn, has led
to a lively historical debate concerning Western attitudes toward homosexual-
ity. 4 ' Even the attempt to equalize the effects of legal marriage and domestic
partnerships of unmarried persons has been opposed on the ground that it
"could undermine the institution of marriage and reflect an ideological bias
against family relationships based on marriage.1
42
In response, it could be observed that legal marriage is today predomi-
nantly an economic community for the material support of the couple during
31 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (West 2003) & I U.S.C. § 7
(West 2003) ("the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife"). States have legislated preemptively to deny the validity of
same-sex marriages recognized elsewhere. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2000)
("Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or performed outside of North
Carolina, between individuals of the same gender are not valid in North Carolina."); NEV.
CONST. ART. I, § 21 ("Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be recog-
nized and given effect in this state.").
38 See Robert Bork, Stop Courts From Imposing Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2001,
at A 14. The proposed amendment would also eliminate any constitutional argument that the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the "legal incidents" of marriage "be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups." Bork admits that "reserving the name of marriage to its
traditional meaning" is purely symbolic, but argues that "symbolism is crucial in cultural
struggles."
" At earlier times, the challenge to legal marriage was advanced by heterosexual advocates
of free love.
40 Letter to Editor by George W. Dent, Jr., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999 (identifying writer as
professor of law at Case Western Reserve University). See also Ex parte H.H., 830 So.2d
21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring) ("Homosexual conduct is, and has been, con-
sidered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of
nature and of nature's God ....").
4 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient
Greek Norms to Modem Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1994) (rejecting his-
torical claims made by witnesses for the State of Colorado in Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993), affirmed, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); Randall Baldwin Clark, Platonic Love in a
Colorado Courtroom: Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, and Plato's Laws in Evans v. Romer,
12 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 1 (2000). See generally K.J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY
(1978); JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE & HOMOSEXUALITY (1980); Car-
los A. Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights Philosophy, 80 N.C. L. REV.
371 (2002).
42 N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002 (quoting Brigham Young University Law Professor Lynn D.
Wardle commenting on report of American Law Institute).
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life, and a means of providing for the support of the survivor.4 3 Subsidies for
child-rearing, such as the homestead exemption from creditors and the possible
set-aside and family allowance in probate,44 constitute a very minor and dis-
tinctly adventitious part of the legal consequences of modern marriage. Almost
every American state permits the complete disinheritance of children but not of
spouses.45 In addition, the benefits of legal marriage are not limited to oppo-
site-sex couples who are capable of child bearing or who, if capable, are prac-
ticing sexual intercourse or sexual intercourse without contraceptive devices or
practices. And, of course, modem reproductive techniques and modern adop-
tion laws make legal parenthood available to single persons and to same-sex
couples. Ever larger numbers of children are, in fact, being raised by unmar-
ried persons. 46 Economic and moral support for parenting, if desired by soci-
ety, may be provided by other, more specific means than restricting the legal
benefits of marriage.
Theoretically, the simplest, but practically the most difficult, solution to
the problem would be the elimination of the legal status of marriage. Stripped
of its legal consequences, marriage would become a strictly private affair.
There may actually have been an historical moment when such a solution was
possible. The spread of Married Women's Property Acts in the last half of the
nineteenth century, affording married women the same property rights as
unmarried women, pointed toward a potential future for legal marriage without
property consequences.4 7 Indeed, in many states, the adoption of a Married
" Unless elective share statutes take the assets of the survivor into account, election against
the will of a deceased spouse can actually increase the net worth of the survivor. See Tracy
Dawn Cobb, Comment, North Carolina's New Elective Share Statute: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 795, 816-17 (2001).
'4 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
45 At common law, spouses were protected by the law of dower and curtesy. Children were
originally protected, to some extent, by the refusal of the common law to recognize the legal
effect of wills, causing all land to pass by inheritance. When wills were first recognized at
law, by virtue of the statutes 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540) and 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542), the
testator was allowed to devise only two-thirds of his lands held by knight service, the rest
necessarily passing by inheritance. Not until the abolition of military tenures in 1660, 12
Car. 2, c. 14, did all land become freely devisable, at which time it became possible to
disappoint the heirs altogether. See KENELM EDWARD DIGBY, INTRODUCTION TO THE His-
TORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 378-79 (1897). In Louisiana, where the civil law
rather than the common law forms the basis of the law of succession, a testator for long
could dispose of only one-third of his estate if he left three or more children, one-half if he
left two, and two-thirds if he left one child. ATKINSON, supra note 2, at § 36, at 139. Due to
changes introduced in 1996, the forced share now applies only to children under the age of
twenty-three and to children of any age who are permanently and totally disabled by mental
or physical handicap. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIv. CODE art. 1493.
46 In 1998, out of 37.7 million family groups with children in the U.S., 12 million were
single-parent families; of these, 6.2 million were headed by a parent who had never married,
4.3 million by a divorced parent, and 1.3 million by a widowed parent. U.S. Census Bureau,
1998 March CPS Detailed Tables, available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/soc
demo/hh-fam.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
47 The first Married Women's Property Act, described as "crude and somewhat tentative,"
was passed by Mississippi in 1839; "by 1850, about seventeen states had granted to married
women some legal capacity to deal with their property." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A His-
TORY OF AMERICAN LAW 185-86 (1973). See also Richard H. Chused, Married Women's
Property Law, 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983).
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Women's Property Act spelled the end of the common-law estate of tenancy by
the entirety,4 8 forcing married couples to hold their property either separately in
sole ownership or together as tenants in common or joint tenants with right of
survivorship - the same choice now offered to unmarried couples. The con-
temporaneous decline of the marital estates of dower and curtesy pointed in the
same direction, at least until statutory elective shares were created to prevent
spousal disinheritance.49 About the same time, general adoption statutes began
the process of creating legal parenthood distinct from biological parenthood,5 °
sometimes even terminating the legal consequences of the biological relation-
ship,5 and opening the possibility of tactical adoptions to prevent will
contests.52
It may be that the focus on the reproductive potential of couples for whom
legal marriage is an option is misplaced. Rather than worrying about what a
couple does together at night, perhaps the law should focus on the daytime
reality. Which brings me back to the story of my aunts, Maud and Mary,
whose lifelong committed relationship was not based on sex. It certainly
never occurred to them to demand the right to marry one another; indeed, they
48 See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 (1875); Appeal of Robinson, 33 A. 652 (Me.
1895); Clark v. Clark, 56 N.H. 105 (1875). Sir William Blackstone did not originally
include tenancy by the entirety in his chapter on concurrent estates because, under traditional
analysis, the married couple was viewed as legally one person. See John V. Orth, Tenancy
by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L.
REV. 35. One reader of the last-cited article found in it a trumpet call for change. Peter M.
Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent Ownership for Modern
Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 424 (2001) (describing the author's project as an
attempt "to address the call for change trumpeted by Professor Orth"). Unfortunately, as the
present reflections suggest, the trumpet sounded an uncertain note.
41 Georgia is today the only non-community property state without an elective share statute.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, WILLS, supra note 20, at 480 n. 1. Despite the statutory lacuna,
most married testators in Georgia reportedly do make provision for their surviving spouses.
Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving
Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 464-70 (1976).
50 The first general adoption statute was passed by Massachusetts in 1851. See ATKINSON,
supra note 2, at § 23, at 86. For the details regarding the development of the law of adop-
tion, see generally Stephen Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of
Adoption, II J. FAM. L. 443 (1971). For an analysis of how the changes in adoption and
child custody law reflected changes in social, psychological, and political thought in the
nineteenth century, see Jamil Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law:
Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979).
11 See, e.g., MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-207(a) (2003) (providing that "on adop-
tion, a child no longer shall be considered a child of either natural parent, except that upon
adoption by the spouse of a natural parent, the child shall still be considered the child of that
natural parent"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17 (2000) (same).
52 Standing to contest a will is restricted to those who would benefit by its disallowance.
Adoption offers a means, therefore, to prevent more remote heirs from having the necessary
standing. See, e.g., Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518, 519 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.)
(describing as "perfectly proper" adoptions by a testator intended "to take away any induce-
ment that some of those who otherwise would have been his heirs might have to oppose his
will").
51 The American Law Institute has recently defined "domestic partners" as "two persons of
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time
share a primary residence and a life together as a couple." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2003). Unless sharing "a life
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would have been shocked (or perhaps amused) by the idea. Had a "domestic
partnership" with the legal benefits of marriage been available, I doubt if they
would have been willing to enter into one, although I would certainly have tried
to talk them into it. The annual income tax savings alone would have been
appreciable, while the prospective survivor's benefits and inheritance tax sav-
ings would have provided them significant peace of mind in old age.
Maud and Mary did not recognize that the law materially disadvantaged,
and perhaps devalued, their relationship. Whatever social stigma they might
have experienced as unmarried women, they did not attribute to the law, even
though conveyancers in their lifetime were still routinely describing unmarried
women, like themselves, as "spinsters." 54 Maud and Mary would, I believe,
have readily agreed with the proposition that marriage is the "union of a man
and a woman." They did not understand that, as a legal institution, marriage
had come to have little or nothing to do with sex but a great deal to do with
property. Indeed, it took a social shift of seismic proportions before the claims
of same-sex couples became publicly audible. A further shift will be required
before the claims of partners not asserting a sexual relationship are taken
seriously.55
The moral of the story of Maud and Mary is not a simple one, nor are the
reflections it engenders likely to please all the participants in the debate con-
cerning same-sex marriage; night thoughts seldom do. On the one hand, it
suggests that merely opening the legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples
would not wring all the inequities out of the current system. There would still
exist couples with a relationship functionally similar to marriage who would be
excluded and therefore economically, and perhaps socially, disadvantaged. On
the other hand, it reveals the ramifying difficulties of abandoning the traditional
basis of legal marriage. Same-sex couples could be accommodated if their life
style approximated that of traditional opposite-sex couples. Two siblings living
together for a lifetime could be added without too much trouble. But what if
there were three5 6 - or more? And what if the basis of the relationship was not
sex or kinship? Should such "marriage equivalents" be recognized as well?
Is the debate about same-sex marriage a debate about fairness to couples
however constituted, or is it only about extending legal and social recognition
to couples whose sexual relationship is not of the monogamous heterosexual
variety ("one man and one woman")? Is it, in other words, about fairness in
together as a couple" implies a physical relationship, this definition excludes a sexual
component.
-4 See, e.g., Jackson v. O'Connell, 177 N.E.2d 194, 194 (I11. 1961). See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1572 (4th ed. 1957) (defining "spinster" as the "addition given in legal proceed-
ings, and in conveyancing, to a woman who never has been married").
55 It can be argued that this shift is already occurring, starting in Hawaii where non-sex
couples are now accorded rights equivalent to marriage under state law. See notes 57-59,
infra, and accompanying text.
56 What if, for example, my father had not married but had spent his life living with his two
sisters? In that case, the long-term relationship of the three would have been accorded none
of the property consequences of legal marriage; the siblings would have been forced to rely
on ordinary private law devices to provide for one another. In that case, too, I would not be
writing this essay.
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general or about fairness to a specific sexual minority? Before we can select a
remedy, we must identify the wrong we are trying to correct.
Recent legislation implicitly recognizes the dilemma. The state of Hawaii
now permits couples composed of "two individuals who are legally prohibited
from marrying" to establish a "reciprocal beneficiary relationship" with the
same legal consequences under state law as marriage.57 Although expressly
open to same-sex couples ("two individuals who are of the same gender"58),
the new relationship is also available to "two individuals who are related to one
another, such as a widowed mother and her unmarried son.",59 The effect, of
course, is to dilute the social, if not the legal, recognition accorded same-sex
couples. While possibly motivated by reasons of political palatability, the
extension to couples whose relationship is not sexual generalizes the remedy to
include couples constituted by kinship. In Hawaii, persons like Maud and
Mary can today secure all the benefits accorded marriage by state law.
In Vermont, by contrast, recent legislation recognizes "civil unions,"
granting them the same legal consequences under state law as marriage, but
limiting them to unrelated persons of the same sex.6 ° Civil unions are
expressly forbidden between persons related to one another, such as Maud and
Mary: "A woman shall not enter a civil union with her... sister."'" The new
Vermont law does permit two related persons to establish a "reciprocal benefi-
ciaries relationship," but the legal consequences include none of the property
consequences incident to legal marriage or civil union.6" The result is to create
two classes of benefits: the first for couples united in legal marriage or civil
unions, the second for all other couples.63
Since it is seemingly too late to go back to a system in which no legal
consequences attach to marriage, and since the legal consequences of marriage
today primarily function to provide economic security to couples and the survi-
vor, perhaps the focus should be on their life together rather than on their sex
life. "Partnership," with its dual connotations of relationship and property, is
actually a better term to describe the legalities of modem marriage than "mar-
riage" itself.' Just as modem adoption laws make parenthood a matter of
" HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1, 572C-3 et seq. (2000). See W. Brian Burnette, Note,
Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving the Controversy Sur-
rounding Same Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81 (1998); Symposium, Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 1-235 (2000).
51 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2.
59 Id. It is noteworthy that the example chosen to illustrate a couple not united by sex, "a
widowed mother and her unmarried son," implicates a common stereotype of the male
homosexual.
60 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1204 (2000). See Symposium, Vermont Civil
Unions, 25 VT. L. REV. 1, 1-353 (2000).
61 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1203.
62 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1301 (limiting benefits of "reciprocal beneficiaries relation-
ship" to matters related to health care, such as visitation rights and medical decision-
making).
63 There are actually three classes of benefits if one places independent value on the label
"marriage." Although couples united in a civil union receive the same benefits under state
law as married couples, the name "marriage" is withheld from same-sex couples.
I Although somewhat old-fashioned, "partner" remains a dictionary synonym for "hus-
band" or "wife." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1648 (1993).
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choice rather than biology, so modem marriage laws could recognize an eco-
nomic rather than a reproductive relationship. Admittedly, the exclusion of a
sexual component from legal marriage would not satisfy those who want to use
the debate concerning same-sex marriage as an opportunity to validate (or con-
demn) the sexual behavior of same-sex couples. If sex could be disregarded,
the debate concerning same-sex marriage could be transformed into a discus-
sion concerning proper criteria for admission to a legal relationship involving
social and economic support: less sexy, but perhaps thereby more productive.
Is that the happy dawn that will follow a dark night of reflections: a future
Utopia where there are no legal marriages but only registered partnerships?
Legal marriage today offers advantages to sexual couples. If same-sex couples
are insignificantly different from opposite-sex couples, then they, too, must be
admitted. By the same reasoning, non-sex couples must also be accommodated
unless their relationship is qualitatively different. And unless kinship couples
are unlike those otherwise united, then all couples, however constituted, must
be included. But then, by what reasoning are the benefits to be limited to
couples? Can sex, which unites and divides us, be so easily banished from our
dreams?
